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Abstract— A distributed computing scenario is considered,
where the computational power of a set of worker nodes is used
to perform a certain computation task over a dataset that is dis-
persed among the workers. Lagrange coded computing (LCC),
proposed by Yu et al., leverages the well-known Lagrange poly-
nomial to perform polynomial evaluation of the dataset in such
a scenario in an efficient parallel fashion while keeping the pri-
vacy of data amidst possible collusion of workers. This solution
relies on quantizing the data into a finite field, so that Shamir’s se-
cret sharing, as one of its main building blocks, can be employed.
Such a solution, however, is not properly scalable with the size of
dataset, mainly due to computation overflows. To address such a
critical issue, we propose a novel extension of LCC to the analog
domain, referred to as analog LCC (ALCC). All the operations
in the proposed ALCC protocol are done over the infinite fields
of R/C but for practical implementations floating-point numbers
are used. We characterize the privacy of data in ALCC, against
any subset of colluding workers up to a certain size, in terms of
the distinguishing security (DS) and the mutual information secu-
rity (MIS) metrics. Also, the accuracy of outcome is characterized
in a practical setting assuming operations are performed using
floating-point numbers. Consequently, a fundamental trade-off
between the accuracy of the outcome of ALCC and its privacy
level is observed and is numerically evaluated. Moreover, we
implement the proposed scheme to perform matrix-matrix mul-
tiplication over a batch of matrices. It is observed that ALCC is
superior compared to the state-of-the-art LCC, implemented us-
ing fixed-point numbers, assuming both schemes use an equal
number of bits to represent data symbols.
Index Terms— Coded computing, privacy-preserving comput-
ing, analog coding
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in recent years towards
performing computational tasks across networks of computa-
tional worker nodes by utilizing their computational power in
a parallel fashion [1]–[4]. Computations over massive datasets
need to be carried out at an unprecedented scale that entails so-
lutions scalable with the size of datasets associated with a wide
range of problems including machine learning [5], optimiza-
tion [6], etc. A well-established network architecture to perform
such tasks in a distributed fashion consists of a master node to-
gether with a set of worker nodes having communication links
only with the master node [3], [4]. In such systems, a dataset is
dispersed among the serves across the network to perform a cer-
tain computational task over the dataset. The master node then
aggregates the results in order to recover the desired outcome,
e.g., the output of a certain function over the dataset.
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Dispersing data across a network gives rise to several fun-
damental challenges in practice. One of the major concerns in
such systems is to keep the data private as the computational
tasks often involve sensitive data such as patients recordings,
financial transactions, etc [7]–[9]. The worker nodes are often
assumed to be honest-but-curious, i.e., they do not deviate from
the protocol but may accumulate the shares of data they receive
and try to deduce information about the data. In such settings,
the challenge is to utilize the computational power of the nodes
while ensuring that almost no information about the dataset is
revealed to them. Furthermore, this restriction is often extended
to preserving the privacy of data against any subset of colluding
nodes up to a certain size.
Several security metrics are considered in different contexts
to measure privacy/security of data. This includes semantic se-
curity (SS) and distinguishing security (DS) in the cryptography
literature [10], mutual information security (MIS) in communi-
cation settings [11], differential security in machine learning
[12], etc. From the information-theoretic perspective, the per-
fect privacy condition in a distributed computation setting is that
no information is leaked about the dataset to any of the worker
nodes/subsets of colluding worker nodes up to a certain size.
To this end, Shamir’s seminal secret sharing scheme is the main
building block in protocols providing perfect privacy in these
settings [13]. In such protocols, the data symbols are always as-
sumed to be elements of a finite field Fp leading to perfect pri-
vacy guarantees. However, this often comes at the expense of
substantial accuracy losses due to fixed-point representation of
the data and computation overflows. Especially, this becomes a
major barrier in scalability of such protocols with respect to the
dataset size.
In a recent prior work, we proposed a novel algorithm to
solve the distributed computing problem when data is in the
analog domain, e.g., the field of real/complex numbers [14]. It
was also shown how the proposed framework can be adopted
to perform computational tasks when data is represented us-
ing floating-point numbers. We then showed that this leads to
a fundamental trade-off between the privacy level of data and
accuracy of the result. Furthermore, experimental advantages
were shown compared to fixed-point implementations over
finite fields [14]. In this paper, we extend these results to La-
grange coded computing (LCC), proposed in [4], that provides
a framework to efficiently perform distributed computation
over a batch of data in a parallel fashion. Note that LCC si-
multaneously provides resiliency against stragglers, security
against malicious workers or workers with erroneous returned
results, and privacy of the dataset [4]. Here, we are mainly con-
cerned with the privacy of dataset in the analog domain. Our
analysis of the proposed scheme also takes into account the
issue with slow/unresponsive nodes, also referred to as strag-
glers. However, the issue with malicious workers is left for
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A. Our contribution
In this paper, we extend the privacy-preserving LCC scheme
to the analog domain and refer to it as analog LCC (ALCC).
It is assumed that all the worker nodes are honest-but-curious.
All the operations in the proposed scheme are done over
the infinite fields of R/C but for practical implementations
floating-point numbers are used. The proposed ALCC proto-
col enables privately evaluating a polynomial function over a
batch of real/complex-valued dataset in parallel. We charac-
terize the performance of the scheme in terms of the accuracy
of its outcome, when operations are performed using standard
floating-point numbers, and the privacy of data in terms of
the DS and MIS metrics when any subset of worker nodes up
to a certain size can collude. It is shown how various param-
eters of the ALCC protocol, including parameters associated
with Lagrange monomials as well as evaluation points in the
complex plain, can be carefully picked in order to provide
closed-form bounds for the performance of the protocol from
both the privacy and the accuracy perspectives. Furthermore,
a fundamental trade-off between the accuracy of the outcome
of ALCC and its privacy level is observed and is numerically
evaluated, in terms of various parameters of the scheme, when
the scheme is implemented using the floating-point numbers.
Moreover, experiments are shown that implement the proposed
scheme to perform matrix-matrix multiplication over a batch
of matrices. The results indicate the superiority of the proposed
ALCC compared to the state-of-the-art LCC implemented us-
ing fixed-point numbers assuming both schemes use an equal
number of bits to represent each data symbol.
B. Related work
Privacy-preserving distributed computing protocols have
been recently studied in a wide range of scenarios to fulfill
specific privacy requirements [15]–[18]. Furthermore, secure
matrix-matrix multiplication, as one of the main building
blocks for various machine learning algorithms, has been ex-
tensively studied in the literature [19]–[23]. Also, Lagrange
coded computing [4] and its variations [24], [25] provide a
framework for evaluating a given polynomial function over a
dataset with perfect privacy [4]. However, these prior works are
often based upon Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in the finite
field and its variations. As a result, they suffer from scalability
issues, as discussed earlier.
Another line of work on performing computations over
real-valued data is considered in [26]–[30]. In these works,
the coded distributed computing schemes are adapted to the
analog domain by addressing the numerical stability issues
arising in the inversion of underlying Vandermonde matri-
ces. However, the privacy constraints are not considered in
these works. In this paper, however, our main focus is on
providing privacy-preserving schemes in the analog domain.
Also, codes in the analog domain have been recently studied
in the context of block codes [31] as well as subspace codes
[32] for analog error correction. However, secret sharing and
privacy-preserving computation in the analog domain are not
discussed in these works.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is discussed and the proposed protocol is de-
scribed. The accuracy of the protocol is analyzed in Section III.
In Section IV the privacy level of data in ALCC is characterized
in terms of two well-known notions of security. Various exper-
imental results are provided in Section V. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a dataset X “ pX1, . . . ,Xkq with Xi P Rmˆn for
all i P rks, where rks denotes t1, 2, . . . , ku. Each entry of Xi’s
is assumed to be an instance of a continuous random variable S
with the range r´r, rs. No further assumptions is made on the
probability distribution of S.
We consider the problem of evaluating a polynomial
f : Rmˆn Ñ Ruˆh over the dataset X in a distributed fash-
ion while keeping the privacy of X. The distributed computing
setup consists of a master node and N worker nodes/parties.
It is assumed that there is no communication link between the
parties. More specifically, in this setup, the goal of the master
node is to compute fpXiq for all i P rks, where f is a degree-D
polynomial, using the computational power of the parties. This
is done in such a way that the dataset is kept private from the
parties assuming up to a certain threshold, denoted by t, of
them can collude. The notion of privacy in the analog domain
will be clarified in Section IV. Note that this setup is similar
to the one considered for LCC in [4] with the main difference
that in [4] the dataset and all the computations are assumed to
be over a finite field. More specifically, our problem setup can
be regarded as an extension of the problem setup considered in
[4] to the analog domain.
Next we discuss the encoding process in analog Lagrange
coded computing (ALCC), i.e., how to encode the dataset
X into the shares distributed to the parties. Let W denote
pX1, . . . ,Xk,N1, . . . ,Ntq where Ni’s are m ˆ n random
matrices with i.i.d. entries drawn from a zero-mean circular
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with standard de-
viation σn?
t
, denoted by N p0, σ2nt q, with t being the maximum
number of colluding parties. Let γ and ω denote the N -th
and the pk ` tq-th root of unity, respectively. In other words,
γ “ expp 2piiN q and ω “ expp 2piik`t q, where i2 “ ´1. In ALCC,
the Lagrange polynomial is constructed as
Upzq “
kÿ
j“1
Xj ljpzq `
k`tÿ
j“k`1
Nj´kljpzq “
k`tÿ
j“1
Wiljpzq, (1)
where ljp¨q’s are Lagrange monomials defined as
ljpzq “
ź
lPrk`tszj
z ´ βl
βj ´ βl , (2)
for all j P rk ` ts. Furthermore, the parameters βj’s are picked
to be equally spaced on the circle of radius β centered around 0
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Fig. 1: Demonstration of the the locations of αi’s and βj’s in the com-
plex plane for k “ 6, t “ 2, N “ 16. Both circles are centered at the
origin.
in the complex plane, for some β P R, i.e.,
βj “ βωj´1. (3)
The shares of encoded dataset to be distributed to the worker
nodes consist of the evaluation of Upzq over the N -th roots of
unity in the complex plane, i.e.,
Yi “ Upαiq, (4)
where
αi “ γi´1, (5)
is sent to node i, for i P rN s. The choice of αi’s and βj’s are
demonstrated in Figure 1 for the choice of parameters k “ 6,
t “ 2, and N “ 16 in the complex plane. It will be clarified
in Section III-A that the specific choice of βj’s according to (3)
enables characterizing a closed-form upper bound on the abso-
lute error of the outcomes of ALCC. In this context, the abso-
lute error is the magnitude of the difference between the ALCC
outcome in a practical setting and the true result of the compu-
tation. It is also shown that picking the certain values of αi’s,
for i P rN s, as specified in (5) is optimal for the accuracy of the
scheme when no stragglers are assumed, i.e., when s “ 0.
Next, we discuss the decoding step during which the master
node recovers the desired outcome by collecting and processing
the results returned by a sufficient number of worker nodes. The
i-th node computes fpYiq and returns the result back to the mas-
ter node. The master node then recovers fpXiq, for i P rks, in
two steps. In the first step, it recovers the polynomial fpUpzqq
by using the results returned from at least pk ` t ´ 1qD ` 1
worker nodes. Note that this is the minimum number of returned
evaluations needed to guarantee a successful interpolation of
fpUpzqq since fpUpzqq has degree pk ` t ´ 1qD. For ease of
notation, let
D˜ “ pk ` t´ 1qD. (6)
In the second step, to recover fpXiq’s, the master node com-
putes fpβjq for j P rks. Note that Upβjq “Wj for j P rk ` ts,
since ljpβiq is 1 for i “ j and is zero otherwise.
The ALCC protocol, as described above, can also take into
account the issue regarding stragglers same as how it is done in
LCC [4]. Let the maximum number of stragglers be denoted by
s. Hence, the number of computational parties is assumed to be
N “ D˜ ` s` 1.
Remark 1: In theory, if the computations are done over the
complex numbers with infinite precision, then fpXiq’s are com-
puted accurately. In practice, however, data is represented using
a finite number of bits, either as fixed point or floating point. We
assume floating-point representation for data symbols and op-
erations involving them in our analysis. This is more suitable to
mimic operations over complex (real) numbers. Let vf denote
the number of precision bits in the floating-point representation
and q denote the number of bits used to represent the power
of the exponent part. Note that the entries of the noise matri-
ces Ni’s are bounded in practice. In other words, for practical
purposes, it is assumed that the entries of the noise matrices
are drawn from the Gaussian distribution that is truncated to”
´θ σn?
t
, θ σn?
t
ı
, for some θ P R.
III. ACCURACY ANALYSIS
In this section, accuracy of the final outcome of ALCC, spec-
ified in Section II, is characterized in terms of various other
parameters of the scheme. This is done assuming that floating-
point numbers are used to represent data symbols and to carry
out operations involving them.
A. Analytical results
We start by providing an alternative characterization for the
Lagrange monomials, defined in (2), given the certain values
for βj’s specified in (3). This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For all j P rk ` ts, we have
ljpzq “ 1
k ` t
k`t´1ÿ
l“0
p z
βj
ql. (7)
Proof: Using (2), one can write
ljpzq “
ź
lPrk`tszj
z
βj
´ βlβj
1´ βlβj
“
k`t´1ź
h“1
z
βj
´ ωh
1´ ωh . (8)
Note that ωh, for h “ 0, 1, . . . , k` t´ 1, is a pk` tq-th root of
unity. Hence, we have
k`t´1ź
h“1
x´ ωh “ x
k`t ´ 1
x´ 1 “
k`t´1ÿ
h“0
xh. (9)
Using (9) one can write
k`t´1ź
h“1
p z
βj
q ´ ωh “ p
z
βj
qk`t ´ 1
z
βj
´ 1 “
k`t´1ÿ
h“0
p z
βj
qh, (10)
and
k`t´1ź
h“1
p1´ ωhq “
k`t´1ÿ
h“0
1 “ k ` t. (11)
Combining (10) and (11) completes the proof.
4In the following lemma, we use Lemma 1 to characterize the
coefficients of Lagrange polynomial in terms of W and other
parameters of the scheme. The result will be used later to derive
an upper bound on the absolute error of the outcome of ALCC.
Lemma 2: The Lagrange polynomial, as specified in (1), can
be written as
Upzq “
k`t´1ÿ
l“0
W˜l
βl
zl, (12)
where
W˜l
def“
k`t´1ÿ
j“0
Wjω´jl. (13)
Proof: The proof is by combining (1) and Lemma 1 as
follows:
Upzq “
k`t´1ÿ
j“0
Wj
1
k ` t
k`t´1ÿ
l“0
p z
βj
ql (14)
“ 1
k ` t
k`t´1ÿ
j,l“0
Wjp z
β
qlω´jl (15)
“ 1
k ` t
k`t´1ÿ
l“0
p z
β
qlp
k`t´1ÿ
j“0
Wjω´jlq (16)
“ 1
k ` t
k`t´1ÿ
l“0
W˜l
βl
zl. (17)
Let wjgl and w˜
j
gl denote the pg, lq-th entry of Wj and W˜j ,
for pg, lq P rms ˆ rns, respectively. Then (13) implies that
pw˜0gl, . . . , w˜k`t´1gl q is the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of
pw0gl, . . . , wk`t´1gl q. Hence, the encoder can utilize the fast al-
gorithms developed for the DFT implementation to compute
W˜j’s and then computes the shares sent to the nodes according
to (12), see, e.g., [33].
The decoder’s task is to interpolate the polynomial fpUpzqq
followed by evaluating it over αi’s, for i P rN s. Let the poly-
nomial fpUpzqq be expressed as
fpUpzqq “
D˜ÿ
i“0
Vizi, (18)
with Vi P Ruˆh. Let A “ ti1, . . . , iD˜`1u denote the indices of
non-straggler users, i.e., users that have returned their compu-
tation results to the master node. The interpolation step at the
decoder is equivalent to inverting the following matrix:
Bpk`tqˆpk`tq
def“
»————–
1 γi1 γ2i1 . . . γD˜i1
1 γi2 γ2i2 . . . γD˜i2
...
...
...
...
...
1 γiD˜`1 γ2iD˜`1 . . . γD˜iD˜`1
fiffiffiffiffifl .
(19)
Remark 2: In general, in a system of linear equations Ax “
y, where x is a vector of unknown variables, the perturbation in
the solution caused by the perturbation in y is characterized as
follows. Let yˆ denote a noisy version of y, where the noise can
be caused by round-off errors, truncation, etc. Let also xˆ denote
the solution to the considered linear system when y is replaced
by yˆ. Let ∆xdef“ xˆ´ x and ∆ydef“ yˆ ´ y denote the perturbation
in x and y, respectively. Then the relative perturbations of x is
bounded in terms of that of y as follows [34]:
‖∆x‖
‖x‖ ď κA
‖∆y‖
‖y‖ , (20)
where κA is the condition number of A and ‖.‖ denotes the l2-
norm.
For pg, lq P rus ˆ rhs, let vigl denote the pg, lq-th element of
Vi for i “ 0, 1, . . . , D˜, where Vi is specified in (18), and f jgl
denote the pg, lq-th element of fpXjq for j P rks. Let also
vgl
def“pv0gl, . . . , vD˜glq,
for g P rus and l P rhs. For ease of notation, let
β “ β
D˜`2 ´ 1
β2 ´ 1 . (21)
The following lemma establishes a relation between the error
in the entries of the outcome of the scheme, i.e., f jgl, and the
entries of Vi, i.e., vigl. Note that in this analysis the error due
to representing αj’s and βj’s using floating-point numbers is
discarded as it is dominated in practice by the error imposed by
the precision loss in the elements of Vi’s, specified in (18).
Lemma 3: For all g P rus, l P rhs, and j P rks we have
∆f jgl ď β ‖vgl‖κB2´vf , (22)
where β is defined in (21), B is defined in (19), and vf is the
number of precision bits in the floating-point representation,
specified in Remark 1
Proof: By using (20) and noting that the precision error in
the considered floating-point numbers is bounded by 2´vf we
have ‖∆vgl‖
‖vgl‖ ď κB2
´vf . (23)
Moreover, note that
fpXjq “ fpUpβjqq “
D˜ÿ
i“0
Viβij .
Let βj denote p1, βj , β2j , . . . , βD˜j q, for j P rks. Then one can
write
f jgl “ βj .vgl, (24)
which implies that
∆f jgl ď
∥∥βj∥∥ ‖∆vgl‖ . (25)
Note that for all j P rks,
∥∥βj∥∥2 ď D˜ÿ
i“0
β2i “ β
D˜`2 ´ 1
β2 ´ 1 “ β. (26)
Combining (23), (25) and (26) yields
∆f jgl ď β ‖vgl‖κB2´vf , (27)
which completes the proof.
In the next theorem, an upper bound on the absolute error in
5the outcome of the protocol is provided.
Theorem 4: The absolute error on the entries of fpXjq, for
j P rks, in the outcome of ALCC is bounded as follows:
∆f jgl ď βaD
?
k ` tmax pm,nqDpkr`tθσnqDκB2´vf , (28)
where β is defined in (21), aD is the leading coefficient of fpXq,
B is defined in (19), and vf is the number of precision bits in
the floating-point representation, specified in Remark 1
Proof: We have
vigl ď aD max pm,nqD max
g,l,j
pw˜jglqD, (29)
assuming that β ą 1, which holds by straightforward computa-
tions and noting that m and n denote the dimension of dataset
entries,D denote the degree of the polynomial fp¨q, and aD de-
note its leading coefficient. Also, Lemma 2 implies that the j-th
entry of the DFT of pw0gl, . . . , wk`t´1gl q is equal to w˜jgl. Hence,
we have
w˜jgl ď kr ` tθσn, (30)
where we used the fact that the absolute value of entries of Xj’s
and Nj’s are less than r and θ σn?t , respectively, as discussed in
Section II. Combining Lemma 3, (29), and (30) yields the re-
sult.
The result of Theorem 4 provides an upper bound on the ac-
curacy of the outcome of ALCC with floating-point implemen-
tation.
Remark 3: Note that when no stragglers are assumed, i.e.,
s “ 0, picking αi’s in the proposed ALCC protocol accord-
ing to (5) implies that the matrix B, defined in (19), is a unitary
matrix. Hence, we have κB “ 1 which is the minimum possible
for the condition number κB. Therefore, this particular choice of
αi’s minimizes the upper bound provided in Theorem 4 on the
error in the outcome of ALCC. In other words, this is the opti-
mal choice for the evaluation points in the complex plane from
the accuracy perspective. For the case of ALCC with stragglers,
i.e., s ą 0, one can utilize the following upper bond on κB [27,
Theorem 1]:
κB ď OpN˜s`6q, (31)
where N˜ is the smallest odd number larger than N . Combin-
ing (31) with (28) leads to an upper bound on the accuracy of
ALCC scheme with s stragglers.
B. Comparisons with LCC and numerical results
In this section we compare the accuracy of ALCC with that
of LCC that employs finite field operations. In LCC the com-
putations are preformed over a finite field of a prime size p,
denoted by Fp, and are implemented using fixed-point num-
bers [4]. In order to have a fair comparison, we assume that
the number of bits that are used to represent data symbols in
ALCC, that uses floating point, and LCC, that uses fixed point,
are equal. Let that number be denoted by b. It is also assumed
that b is fixed throughout the implementation of the scheme. It
is shown in Section III-A how the accuracy of ALCC depends
on b. Same as in ALCC, the accuracy of LCC also depends on
b as discussed next.
In LCC the real-valued data are assumed to be first quantized
and then mapped to elements of Fp. Also, note that if a sym-
bol computed during the process by one of the workers in LCC
becomes larger than p, an incident referred to as an overflow
error, then a successful recovery of the outcome of the compu-
tation can not be guaranteed. Let ∆ denote the corresponding
quantization step. Then, in order to avoid overflow errors, it is
required that
aD
∆
maxpm,nqDp r
∆
qD ď p
2
, (32)
since the left hand-side of (32) corresponds to the maximum
value of the polynomial fp¨q when evaluated over to the quan-
tized data. The latter is by noting that the leading coefficient and
degree of f are aD and D, respectively, the quantization step is
∆, and the magnitude of the entries of X is upper bounded by
r.
The next step is to characterize how large p can be given the
fixed number of representation bits b. To this end, two differ-
ent scenarios can be considered regarding how the intermedi-
ate multiplications, at the worker nodes, are carried out. More
specifically, the intermediate multiplications may or may not be
done modulo p. We consider the two cases separately and pro-
vide bounds on the accuracy in both cases. Performing inter-
mediate multiplications modulo p leads, in general, to a better
accuracy, as will be also shown in the remaining of this sec-
tion. However, this improvement comes at the cost of increased
latency of the fixed-point implementation. This is because, in
practice, performing multiplications over large finite fields re-
quire further processing, compared to the regular multiplica-
tion, and are slower than the regular multiplications.
In the first case, it is assume that the intermediate multiplica-
tions are done modulo p. Then in order to avoid overflow errors
in multiplications while employing fixed-point implementation,
it is necessary to have
p2 ď 2b, (33)
In the second case, it is assumed that the underlying multipli-
cations are done over Z and the worker nodes need to compute
the result modulo p only once after the polynomial evaluations
are completed. In this case, the condition in (33) is modified as
follows:
aD
∆
maxpm,nqDpD ď 2b. (34)
Combining (32) with (33), for the first case, and with (34),
for the second case, provides lower bounds on the absolute er-
ror of the outcomes of LCC. In particular, one must have
paDr
D maxpm,nqD
2p b2´1q
q 1D`1 ď ∆, (35)
for the first case, and
pa
p1` 1D q
D maxpm,nqpD`1qrD
2p bD´1q
qp DD2`D`1 q ď ∆, (36)
for the second case.
Now, consider ALCC with floating-point implementation
where each symbol is represented by b bits. In current standard
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Fig. 2: Comparison of upper bound on the absolute error in floating-
point (FLP) implementation with lower bounds on the error in fixed-
point (FXP) implementation employing conventional (FXP 1) and
(FXP 2). The parameters are as follows: D “ 2, k “ 5, t “ 3, s “
0, aD “ 1,m “ n “ 1000, r “ 100, θ “ 3, σn “ 1012.
systems, 8 bits are allocated to represent the exponent. Also,
one bit is reserved for indication of zero and one bit is reserved
for the sign flag. Hence, the total number of precision bits vf
is equal to b ´ 10. We use these parameters to plot the bounds
on the accuracy of ALCC versus that of LCC. In Figure 2, the
upper bound on the absolute error in ALCC with floating-point
implementation, provided in Theorem 4, is plotted and is com-
pared with the lower bounds on the absolute error in LCC with
fixed-point implementation, provided in (34) and (35), for the
two discussed cases. Note that these bounds are plotted as a
function of b, i.e., the total number of bits reserved to represent
a data symbol in both the fixed-point and the floating-point
implementation while the other parameters of the system are
fixed. It can be observed that for b larger than a certain thresh-
old, the upper bound derived on the error in ALCC is smaller
than both of the lower bounds on the error in LCC. Since these
bounds may not be tight, the actual threshold would perhaps be
lower than what is shown in Figure 2.
One can also analyze the aforementioned bounds in terms of
the decay rate of the absolute error as b increases. More specif-
ically, the lower bounds on the absolute error in LCC, derived
in (34) and (35), decay exponentially in b with an exponent be-
tween 12pD`1q and
1
D2`D`1 . However, the upper bound on the
absolute error in ALCC, derived in (28), decays exponentially
in b with exponent 1. This significant improvement in accuracy
comes at the expense of deviating from the perfect privacy, in an
information-theoretic sense, in ALCC compared to LCC. This
will be discussed in details in the next section. In particular, it
will be shown that this deviation is negligible for practical pur-
poses.
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the privacy level of data in ALCC
by considering two notions of security, namely, the mutual in-
formation security (MIS) and the distinguishing security (DS)
over the continuous probability space.
A. Privacy analysis with Gaussian noise
We first characterize the privacy of ALCC in terms of the
MIS metric by utilizing existing results on the capacity of
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) channel. Furthermore,
by using the relation between the MIS and the DS security met-
rics in the analog domain, recently observed in [14], the privacy
of ALCC is also characterized in terms of the DS metric.
Consider the ALCC protocol described in Section II. For j P
rks and i P rts, letXj andNi denote the pg, lq-th element of the
matrices Xj and Ni, respectively, for some fixed g P rms and
l P rns. For the sake of clarity, g and l are fixed throughout this
section. However, the analysis does not depend on the specific
choice of g and l.
The Lagrange polynomial introduced in (1) is written for the
fixed considered indices as follows:
Upzq “
kÿ
j“1
Xj ljpzq `
k`tÿ
j“k`1
Nj´kljpzq, (37)
where data symbols Xj’s are random variables with arbitrary
distribution and with the range Dx
def“r´r, rs, for j P rks, and
Ni „ N p0, σ
2
n
t q, for i P rts. Let Yi denote the corresponding
entry of Yi, for i P rN s. In other words, Yi “ Upαiq. Let T “
ti1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , itu denote the set of indices for the colluding parties.
Let also X , N , and YT denote pX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XkqT, pN1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , NtqT,
and pYi1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , YitqT, respectively, where p¨qT is the transpose
operation. By convention, a random variable/vector is denoted
by a capital letter and its instance is denoted by the correspond-
ing lower case letter.
The following equation relates the encoded symbols received
by the colluding set of parties T to the dataset symbols and the
added noise symbols:
YT “ LTX ` L˜TN, (38)
where
LT
def“
»———–
l1pαi1q . . . lkpαi1q
l1pαi2q . . . lkpαi2q
...
...
...
l1pαitq . . . lkpαitq
fiffiffiffifl
tˆk
, (39)
and
L˜T
def“
»———–
lk`1pαi1q . . . lk`1pαi1q
lk`2pαi2q . . . lk`2pαi2q
...
...
...
lk`tpαitq . . . lk`tpαitq
fiffiffiffifl
tˆt
. (40)
The amount of information revealed to the set of colluding par-
ties can be measured in terms of the MIS metric, denoted by ηc,
defined as follows:
ηc
def“ max
T
max
PX :|Xj |ăr,@jPrks
IpYT ;Xq, (41)
where PX is the probability density function (PDF) of X and
the maximization is taken over all T Ă rN s with |T | “ t. Since
7|Xj | ď r, we have ErXjs2 ď r2. Then, one can write
ηc ď max
T
max
PX :ErX2j sďr2
IpX;YT q. (42)
Next, we characterize the right hand side of (42) in terms of
other parameters of the system. To this end, the capacity results
of MIMO channels are utilized as discussed next. Consider a
MIMO channel with k transmit and t receive antennas and the
input-output relation
y “ Hx` n, (43)
where y and x are the kˆ 1 transmitted signal and the tˆ 1 re-
ceived signal vectors, respectively, Htˆk represent the channel
gain matrix known to both the transmitter and the receiver, and
ntˆ1 is an additive zero-mean Gaussian noise vector. Let Nc
denote the noise correlation matrix. By using the results on the
capacity of MIMO channel with equal-power allocation con-
straint and correlated noise, one can get an upper bound on the
right-hand side of (42). The capacity of this MIMO channel,
under equal-power allocation constraint, is well-known and is
expressed as follows [35, IV-A]:
C “ log2 |It ` PN´1c HHH |, (44)
where P is the maximum transmission power of each antenna
at the transmitter side and It is the tˆ t identity matrix.
Theorem 5: In the proposed ALCC, the MIS metric ηc, de-
fined in (41), is upper bounded as follows:
ηc ď max
T
log2 |It ` r
2t
σ2n
Σ˜´1T ΣT |, (45)
where Σ˜T
def“ L˜T L˜HT and ΣT def“LTLHT . Also, Σ˜T and L˜T are
specified in (39) and (40), respectively.
Proof: Note that in (38) the term L˜TN can be regarded as
the noise vector and, consequently, (38) can be turned into an
equation similar to (43) describing the MIMO channel model.
Hence, by using this observation together with (44) and the def-
inition of capacity, (42) leads to (45).
Corollary 6: For r “ opσnq, we have
ηc ď 1
lnp2q maxT trpΣ˜
´1
T ΣT q
r2t
σ2n
` op r
2
σ2n
q. (46)
Proof: The proof is by utilizing
|It ` A| “ 1` trpAq ` opq
together with
log2p1` q “ lnp2q ` opq
in the upper bound presented in Theorem 5.
Next, we characterize the privacy of ALCC in terms of the
DS metric. The DS metric is defined using the notion of the to-
tal variation (TV) distance DTV p., .q. In general, for any two
probability measures P1 and P2 on a σ-algebra F , the TV dis-
tance is defined as DTV pP1, P2qdef“ supBPF |P1pBq ´ P2pBq|.
While DS metric is often defined for discrete random variables
in the cryptography literature, it can be also extended to the
case of continuous random variables [14]. In particular, in the
proposed ALCC protocol ηs is defined as as follows:
ηs
def“ max
T
max
x1,x2PDX
DTVpPYT |X“x1 , PYT |X“x2q, (47)
where DX “ r´r, rsk is the support of X . Note that, roughly
speaking, a smaller value for ηs implies data is kept more pri-
vate against any set of t colluding parties.
Next, we discuss the privacy guarantee for ALCC in terms of
the DS metric ηs. This is done by utilizing relations between ηc
and ηs and the upper bound on ηc derived in Theorem 5.
Relations between MIS and DS metrics was first established
in [36] though for discrete random variables. In particular, it is
shown in [36] that:
ηs ď
a
2ηc, (48)
assuming all underlying random variables are discrete. This re-
sult is recently extended to the analog domain in [14]. In other
words, it is shown that (48) also holds when the underlying ran-
dom variables are continuous. Then, combining (45) with (48)
yields the following upper bound on the DS metric ηs:
ηs ď
d
2 max
T
log2 |It ` r
2t
σ2n
Σ˜´1T ΣT |. (49)
In particular, for r “ opσnq, we have
ηs ď
d
2t
lnp2q maxT trpΣ˜
´1
T ΣT q
r
σn
` op r
σn
q. (50)
Remark 4: Note that both (45) and (49) imply that increas-
ing the standard deviation of the added noise, i.e., σn, while
other parameters of ALCC are fixed, improves bounds on the
privacy level of ALCC. However, this improvement comes at
the expense of degrading the accuracy of the outcome of ALCC,
according to Theorem 4. This exhibits a fundamental trade-off
between the accuracy and privacy of ALCC. Such a trade-off
between accuracy and privacy in the analog domain has been
observed for the first time in [14] for a privacy-preserving dis-
tributed computing setup.
Next, the provided upper bounds on the maximum amount of
information revealed about the dataset to a subset T of collud-
ing parties with size t are numerically evaluated. This is done
for both the MIS security metric, bounded in (45), as well as the
DS metric, bound in (49), for a certain set of parameters and the
results are shown in Figure 3. Both ηs and ηc are plotted versus
β. It can be observed that that both the bounds are decreased by
increasing β. In other words, this indicates that increasing β, in
general, leads to enhancement in the privacy of the ALCC pro-
tocol. However, the provided upper bound on the accuracy of
the outcome of ALCC, provided in (28), implies that the preci-
sion loss would also grow by increasing β. The upper bound on
the absolute error in ALCC is plotted versus β in Figure 4 for a
certain set of parameters. This together with the plot in Figure 3
demonstrates a new fundamental trade-off between the accu-
racy and the privacy of the ALCC protocol which is specific to
ALCC and is controlled by the choice of β. It can be also ob-
served from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that a reasonable value for
β, e.g., β “ 1.5, can be picked for which the upper bounds on
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Fig. 3: Upper bounds on ηs and ηc for N “ 15, k “ 4, t “ 4, σn “
1023, r “ 1010.
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Fig. 4: Upper bound on the accuracy of ALCC versus β forD “
2, k “ 4, t “ 4, s “ 0, aD “ 1,m “ n “ 1000, r “ 1010, θ “
3, σn “ 1023 and v “ 200.
ηs and ηc are reasonably low, e.g., „ 10´10 and „ 10´20, re-
spectively, while the upper bound on the error in the outcome is
reasonable for practical purposes, e.g., „ 10´3.
B. Privacy analysis with truncated noise
The results presented in Section IV-A are derived assuming
that the entries of the noise matrices Ni’s in (1) are drawn from
a complex circular-symmetric Gaussian distribution. However,
as discussed in Section III, these noise terms should be bounded
for practical implementations. In other words, the actual PDF of
the noise terms is a properly scaled version of the Gaussian PDF
truncated between ´θ σn?
t
and θ σn?
t
, for some θ P R. Roughly
speaking, we say that the noise terms are truncated. In this sec-
tion, we extend the results on bounding ηs to the case with the
noise terms being truncated. We use the upper bound on the DS
metric in a similar setup with truncated complex Gaussian noise
[14] that involves the following quantity:
dmean
def“ max
T
max
x1,x2PDX
|LT px1 ´ x2q|. (51)
Note that conditioned on X “ x in (38), YT is a complex
Gaussian vector with mean LT x. Then the parameter dmean,
defined in (51), is the maximum Euclidean distance between
the means of any two such conditional random vectors in the
t-dimensional complex vector space, where the maximum is
taken over the set of all colluding sets T with size t and all
x1, x2 in the range of the random vector X . In the following
lemma an upper bound on dmean is obtained by using the al-
ternative characterization of Lagrange monomials derived in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 7: The parameter dmean, defined in (51), is upper
bounded as follows:
dmean ď kr
k ` t
p 1β qk`t ´ 1
p 1β q ´ 1
. (52)
Proof: For all x1, x2 P DX and T Ă rN s with |T | “ t, we
have
|LT px1 ´ x2q| ď |LT x1| ` |LT x1| (53)
ď 2 max
xPDX
|LT x| (54)
ď 2?tmax
αi:
iPrNs
max
x1,¨¨¨ ,xk:|xi|ďr
kÿ
j“1
xj ljpαiq (55)
ď kr max
αi:
iPrNs
|ljpαiq| (56)
ď kr
k ` t
p 1β qk`t ´ 1
p 1β q ´ 1
, (57)
where (55) is by the definition of LT in (39) and noting that
LT x is a t-dimensional vector, (56) holds by noting that |xi| ă
r and the summation has k terms, and (57) is by |xi| ă r, upper
bounding |ljpαiq| by (7) and noting that |αi| “ 1 for all i.
Let η1s denote the DS metric for the case where the noise
terms in (1) are truncated. The following theorem provides an
upper bound on η1s in terms of ηs, the upper bound on dmean,
and other parameters of the ALCC protocol.
Theorem 8: The DS metric, defined in (47), for the case
where the entries of Ni’s in (1) are drawn from a truncated
complex Gaussian distribution with truncation level θ σn?
t
satisfies the following inequality:
η1s ď 1wηs `
1
w
p2 expp´1
2
pθ ´ dmean
?
t
σn
q2qqt,
where w “ p1´ 2 expp´ θ22 qqt and
dmean
def“ kr
k ` t
p 1β qk`t ´ 1
p 1β q ´ 1
.
Proof: The proof follows by combining [14, Theorem 5]
and Lemma 7.
A numerical evaluation of the bound provided in Theorem 8
implies that, for instance, having θ “ 10 with t “ 10, together
with a very small rσn , which is often the case in practice, we get
η1s « ηs. In other words, the privacy of dataset is not compro-
9m1
β
1.1 1.5 1.8 2
104 4.466 3.304 2.316 1.699
2ˆ 104 4.532 3.307 2.320 1.713
4ˆ 104 4.584 3.306 2.331 1.723
6ˆ 104 4.602 3.316 2.326 1.727
8ˆ 104 4.612 3.313 2.332 1.731
105 4.614 3.320 2.334 1.728
TABLE I: Demonstration of ´ log10perelq in ALCC for multiple
dataset sizes and β “ 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 2. Other parameters are k “ 5, t “
3, s “ 0, N “ 15, σn “ 106, n “ 100 for all schemes.
mised by truncating the noise terms as long as θ is large enough,
e.g., θ “ 10.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of ALCC
when applied to a certain computational task through experi-
ments. In the first part of this section, it is shown that the pre-
cision of ALCC outcome closely follows that of a centralized
computation, that is when the computations are done directly
at a central node without any encoding and decoding. In par-
ticular, it is shown that the accuracy of ALCC is scalable with
dataset size, i.e., the precision of the results remains almost the
same for a wide range of sizes of the dataset. In the second part,
the performance of LCC [4] employing fixed-point representa-
tion applied to the same computational task is demonstrated. It
is shown that the error in the outcome of LCC experiences a
sharp increase due to overflow errors as the dataset size passes
a certain threshold.
We consider the task of performing a certain matrix-matrix
multiplication. For the sake of clarity, we consider comput-
ing XTX where X P Rm1ˆn is a tall real-valued matrix, i.e.,
m1 " n. Such computation is one of the main building blocks
in various learning algorithms including training a linear re-
gression model [4], or a logistic regression model [14], [17],
etc., where X represents a dataset consisting of m1 samples
in an n-dimensional feature space. The matrix X can be rep-
resented as a batch of matrices X “ pXT1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,XTkqT, where
Xi P Rmˆn with m1 “ k ˆm. Then we have
XTX “
kÿ
i“1
XTi Xi.
Hence, the task of computing XTX is reduced to evaluating a
degree-2 polynomial over a batch of matrices, consisting of
X1,. . . ,Xk, for which ALCC can be utilized to provide speed
up by leveraging the computational power of distributed nodes
in parallel.
Let Y denote the result of computing XTX in a centralized
fashion employing floating-point operations. Let also Y1 denote
the result of a distributed computing protocol, e.g., ALCC. In
order to measure the accuracy loss of the outcome in the dis-
tributed protocol compared to the centralized one, we consider
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the relative error in the outcome between
ALCC and LCC. For LCC, different values of p are considered (p „
225, p „ 226, p „ 228). For ALCC, β “ 2 and β “ 1.5 are consid-
ered for FLP1 and FLP2, respectively. Also, in both protocols we have
k “ 5, t “ 3, s “ 0, N “ 15, σn “ 106, and n “ 100.
the following notion of relative error:
erel
def“ ‖Y
1 ´ Y‖
‖Y‖ . (58)
In a sense, erel measures how much the outcome precision is
proportionally compromised by utilizing a distributed protocol
while providing privacy/speed up. The entries of the dataset X
in our experiments are drawn independently from a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with variance 1. We use 64 bits for both
the fixed-point and the floating-point numbers to implement
both the LCC and the ALCC protocols in our experiments,
respectively.
The relative error erel, defined in (58), is computed for the
outcome of ALCC in our experiment and is shown in Table I
for a range of values for the dataset size, that is represented by
m1, and the Lagrange monomials parameter β. As discussed in
Section IV-A, it is expected that increasing β results in lower
precision outcomes which is also shown in our experiment. But
note that it also leads to better privacy as shown in Figure 3.
Also, no notable dependence between the relative error in the
outcome of ALCC and the size of dataset m1 is observed in Ta-
ble I. This implies that ALCC is scalable with the dataset size
as far as the relative error is concerned.
Next, the performance of LCC [4] employing fixed-point
numbers is compared to that of ALCC from the relative er-
ror perspective. In Figure 5, the relative error is plotted for
both LCC and ALCC versus the parameter m1, that is propor-
tional to the size of the dataset. For LCC, this is plotted for a
few different choices for the size of the underlying finite field
p, according to the discussion in Section III-B and keeping in
mind that the total number of available bits for representation
is 64. In particular, the first case discussed in Section III-B is
assumed where the worker nodes compute the results module
p only once after the polynomial evaluations are completed.
Also, for ALCC, erel is plotted for two values of β. It can be ob-
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served in Figure 5 that for all the scenarios considered for LCC,
there exists a certain threshold for m1 after which the computa-
tion results become very unreliable due to a very high erel. As
discussed earlier, this significant precision loss is mostly due to
overflow errors that are inherent to the fixed-point implemen-
tation employed by LCC. As expected, the sharp increase in
erel occurs at a larger value for m1 when a larger p is picked.
However, the choice of p is limited by the number of bits avail-
able for representing fixed-point numbers. Furthermore, the
advantage of ALCC compared to LCC is evident in Figure 5 by
observing that the relative error in the outcome of ALCC with
floating-point implementation is almost constant for the con-
sidered range of sizes of the dataset. This motivates employing
ALCC in certain problems involving very large datasets.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the Lagrange coded computing framework is
extended to the analog domain in order to efficiently evaluate
polynomials over real-valued datasets in a distributed fashion.
To this end, the analog Lagrange coded computing (ALCC)
protocol is proposed that leverages Lagrange polynomials with
a certain set of parameters carefully chosen in the complex
plane. The privacy of ALCC is measured in terms of the DS
and the MIS security metrics in the analog domain. By utilizing
the relations between the DS and the MIS security measures
and the existing results on the capacity of MIMO channel
with correlated noise, bounds on the privacy level of data in
ALCC, amidst possible collusion of workers, is characterized
in terms of the aforementioned measures. Moreover, the accu-
racy of the outcome of ALCC is characterized assuming that
the floating-point numbers are employed in the implementation
of the protocol. Furthermore, a new trade-off between the ac-
curacy of the outcome and the privacy level of the protocol is
characterized that is controlled by the choice of Lagrange poly-
nomial parameters. In our experiments, the ALCC is adopted
to perform matrix-matrix multiplication and the outcome is
compared to the computation result in a centralized fashion.
Finally, the scalability of ALCC and LCC with respect to the
dataset size are compared together. It is shown that the ac-
curacy of LCC significantly diminishes after the dataset size
passes a certain threshold while the accuracy of ALCC remains
almost constant for a wide range of dataset sizes.
There are several directions for future work. Characteriz-
ing the accuracy and the privacy level of the ALCC protocol
for a general choice of Lagrange monomial parameters βj’s
in the complex plane is an interesting direction. In particular,
it is not known what choice of βj’s provides the best pos-
sible accuracy-privacy trade-off in ALCC and how tight the
bounds provided in this paper are with respect to such an op-
timal scenario. Another direction is to extend ALCC in order
to take into account the presence of Byzantine workers, i.e.,
the worker nodes that deliberately send erroneous computation
results [37]–[40]. Providing an efficient and numerically accu-
rate counterpart of Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm in the
analog domain would be the main challenge in this direction.
Adopting ALLC to provide speed up in performing computa-
tional tasks involved in a wide range of applications such as
decentralized control, distributed optimization, data mining,
etc. [41]–[45] is another future direction. Generalizing ALCC
in order to evaluate multiple polynomials in one round by ap-
plying techniques utilized in multi-user secret sharing [46] is
another approach to be considered for future work.
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